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DISGORGEMENT IN SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
BROUGHT BY THE SEC
John D. Ellsworth*
Roughly a decade ago the Securities and Exchange Commission first
argued in federal court for the right to seek restitution of the ill-gotten profits
of securities law violators.' The Commission eventually won that argu-
ment,2 and it has been successful in subsequent cases as well.3 Encouraged
* Member, District of Columbia and Nebraska Bars. The author wishes to express his
appreciation for the assistance of Murray Drabkin, Esq. in the preparation of this Article.
I. SEC Pretrial Memorandum of Law, April 25, 1966, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968). The SEC's complaint in Texas Gulf Sulphur was filed on April 19,
1965. See also SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., SEC Litigation Release 3235 (May 19, 1965)
(restitution sought in an action based on insider trading-consent judgment); cf. SEC v.
Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
A much earlier effort by the SEC to achieve such a right was abortive. In SEC v. Robert
Collier & Co., Inc., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1935), the SEC did request, in its complaint for an
injunction based in part on anti-fraud violations, an impoundment by the court of receipts from
allegedly illegal sales. The defendants entered into a consent decree which directed them to
return to subscribers the remaining balance of those receipts. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1828 n.483 (2d ed. 1961).
Prior to filing the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the Commission had established that it could
seek relief ancillary to an injunctive action in the form of court-appointed receivers in extraor-
dinary cases where corporate assets would be jeoparized if left unprotected against future
fraudulent activities. Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964);
SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1963); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); cf. SEC v. Bennett
& Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962) (appointment of receiver denied as not necessary under
the circumstances).
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd on this
point, rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
3. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103-06 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,867 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1976); SEC v.
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by an unbroken string of victories, the SEC has aggressively pursued this
equitable form of relief, until today the demand for restitution, or "dis-
gorgement," has assumed a prominent and still expanding role in the
Commission's enforcement program. 4
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISGORGEMENT CONCEPT IN
SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
Nowhere within the statutory framework of the federal securities laws5
did Congress provide that the SEC would have the power to make a violator
of the anti-fraud provisions disgorge tainted profits. Nor is there any direct
reference in the legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1933 or
1934 Acts which would encourage the utilization of such an enforcement
tool by the SEC.6 It would appear that this dearth of legislative support
dissuaded the Commission for some three decades from testing in court the
right to obtain such relief. That is not to say, however, that during this long
period the Commission was necessarily content with obtaining only injunc-
tions against the perpetrators of securities fraud.
Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v.
General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Blatt, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281, at 98,444 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 1975); SEC v.
Weisberger, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,108, at 97,944
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1975); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (S.D. Fla.
1974); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also SEC v. Quing
N. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966); ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1515(i) (revised text of Tent.
Draft Nos. 1-3 (1974)).
The Commission's only setback was short-lived. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 252
F. Supp. 623 (D. Ariz. 1966), the court denied an SEC request to invalidate a merger of two
insurance companies on grounds of fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy
materials because it would violate certain provisions of the McCarran Act (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
(1970)). The Court also rejected the SEC's prayer for an accounting for unjust enrichment as
inappropriate and outside the scope of section 21(e) of the 1934 Act. On appeal the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the rejection of the request to invalidate the merger on the basis of the
prohibition in the McCarran Act. 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967). The opinion did not discuss the
lower court's denial of the disgorgement prayer. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
finding that the relief sought was not prohibited by the McCarran Act. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Subsequent proceedings in the case on remand, if any, were not reported.
4. A comparison by the author of SEC Litigation Releases for 1972 and 1975 indicates that
in those injunctive actions based at least in part on allegations of fraud, some form of restitution
was sought in approximately 20 percent of the cases in 1972, whereas by 1975 this figure had
increased to approximately 32 percent.
5. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. 99 78a-78hh (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 99 79-
79z-6 (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970) (section 42(e) of this statute
empowers a court of equity to take jurisdiction and possession of an investment company and
to appoint a trustee to dispose of any or all of its assets); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
6. In fact, the legislative history of the 1934 Act has been cited against the SEC's position
on disgorgement. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1971).
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A. Cases Prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur
Even in its early days, the Commission was occasionally able to
achieve consensual restitution when challenging securities transactions. In
Ward La France Truck Corp.,7 for instance, the Commission dropped a
would-be enforcement action when the alleged violators agreed to restitu-
tion. In that case insiders used their confidential knowledge of the corpora-
tion's rapidly expanding wartime business to take advantage of the other
shareholders. They authorized a broker to purchase stock for their benefit at
what were later found to be unfair prices. Once the SEC began to investi-
gate, the insiders and a successor company agreed to pay back to the
innocent shareholders profits of approximately $165,000 which they had
garnered through the improper trading. 8 The formula used in computing
these profits was solely that of the insiders, and was not passed upon by the
Commission.9
Another early example of the SEC's ability to obtain voluntary restitu-
tion is found in SEC v. First Investment Co. of Concord.10 There the
Commission was seeking injunctive relief in a complaint which alleged
fraudulent purchases on inside information from May 21, 1942 to the end of
1944. Jackman, a defendant who had traded on the inside information
through the First Investment Company, agreed in a consent decree filed
jointly with the complaint to make restitution to all security holders of
record whose shares were purchased from November 1, 1940 to January 1,
1945, a period even longer than that alleged in the complaint. Jackman
further agreed that the amount of the restitution would be the difference
between the amount paid to the security holders and the value of the
securities. The value was determined not as of the date that the inside
information became public, but rather on the date of liquidation of the
company which the securities represented. This formula had the effect of
further increasing the aggregate profit Jackman agreed to give up. Despite
these occasional successes, however, the Commission's court enforcement
activities during this period were limited mainly to seeking injunctive relief
alone. 1
In the early 1960s the Commission's policy of friendly persuasion to
7. 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
8. Id. at 378.
9. Id. at 378 n.5.
10. SEC Litigation Release No. 281 (June 20, 1945).
11. The Commission was able to achieve some impressive recoveries of allegedlyfraudu-
lent gains through consents to restitution counts which were tentatively included in its com-
plaints shortly before commencement of the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. See SEC v. Skagit
Valley Telephone Co., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 3393 (Dec. 21, 1965), 3482 (Apr. 8, 1966)
($450,000); SEC v. VTR, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 3311 (Sept. 8, 1965) ($1 million plus).
Voluntary restitution was more commonly achieved by the SEC in cases involving the
violation of the registration provisions of Section 5 of the 1933 Act. For a collection of these
cases, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1824 n.469.
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achieve restitution came under criticism from securities law expert Professor
Louis Loss. In the 1961 edition of his treatise, Loss argued convincingly
that the SEC, by virtue of two Supreme Court decisions 12 and the general
equity jurisdiction of all federal courts, possessed the requisite legal power
to obtain enforced restitution and that the Commission had been overly
cautious in not seeking such a remedy for securities violations. 3 He noted
that the SEC was in the best position to vindicate investor rights under the
securities statutes when the violation involved "many victims, each having
lost too small an amount to warrant the trouble and expense of a private
lawsuit.' 1 4 Loss did recognize that the policy restraints against the SEC
becoming a "private collection agency," as voiced by one of its chairmen,
William Cary, 5 deserved some weight where only a single, isolated trans-
action was involved.' 6 But in the commonplace situation where there were
many victims, each with small losses, Cary, too, tended to agree with Loss
that an action by the Commission to secure redress would be justified.17
Professor Loss saw support for his claim that the SEC was not limited
to injunctions alone in combating securities fraud in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co. 18 In Porter, the Administrator of the Office of Price Adminis-
tration had instituted an injunctive action against a landlord for excessive
rent charges under section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942.19 The Administrator also sought a refund of all those amounts col-
lected by the lessor which were in excess of the maximum rents established
by federal regulation. The Price Control Act specifically provided that
individuals could bring their own actions to recover excess rents;20 it did not
mention a similar right for the Administrator. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court found that he was equally entitled to sue for restitution despite this
lack of explicit statutory authority. The Court initially noted the inherent
equitable powers of the district court to fashion relief necessary under the
circumstances and not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear
legislative command.2' But the Court emphasized somewhat the fact that the
section of the statute authorizing injunctive relief also authorized the district
12. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
13. 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1827-29. •
14. Id.
15. Cary, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 857 (1962). See also Speech of SEC Commis-
sioner Richard B. Smith at the Program of Continuing Legal Education of the California Bar, at
Los Angeles, Jan. 12, 1968. "The Commission attempts to avoid being a collection agency for
injured investors. . . ." (on file at the SEC library, Washington, D.C.).
16. 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1828-29.
17. Cary, supra note 15, at 861.
18. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
19. 77 Pub. L. No. 421, 56 Stat. § 205(a), 23, 33 (1942) (terminated 1947).
20. Id. § 205(e), 56 Stat. at 34, as amended by Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, 78 Pub.
L. No. 383, 108, 58 Stat. 632, 640-41.
21. 328 U.S. at 397-98.
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court, upon a proper showing, to grant "a permanent or temporary injunc-
tion, restraining order, or other order. "2 The term "other order" was seen
as contemplating a remedy entered in the exercise of the district court's
equity discretion.23 Moreover, the legislative history cited by the Court
afforded additional support for this view by stating that: "Such courts are
given jurisdiction to issue whatever order to enforce compliance is proper
under the circumstances of each particular case." 24 Neither the statutory
language nor the legislative history of the 1933 or 1934 Acts, however,
could offer such assistance to the SEC's cause.
Several other Supreme Court decisions of the Porter vintage appear to
have figured into the Commission's eventual support of the disgorgement
concept. 25 In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,26 the Court answered
affirmatively the question of whether the 1933 Act authorized a purchaser of
securities to maintain a suit in equity to rescind a fraudulent sale and secure
restitution of the consideration paid.27 However, Deckert involved the
remedial powers of a purchaser of securities in the context of an acknowl-
edged right of recovery afforded by section 12(2) of the Act.28 Thus, the
Court's decision in favor of petitioner's broad implied powers to enforce
that right of recovery was of only marginal assistance to the SEC, which had
yet to establish clearly that a similar right existed for it as well.
In Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States,29 which involved
Sherman Act violations, the Court again recognized the inherent limitations
of an injunctive action by the government. It said that because of these
limitations, courts must resort to more effective equitable remedies even
though they are not specifically provided for in the statute. Mr. Justice
Douglas articulated the need for such extra-statutory relief:
If all that was done was to forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct,
those who had unlawfully built their empires could preserve them
intact. They could retain the full dividends of their monopolistic prac-
tice and profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had
inflicted on competitors. Such a course would make enforcement of the
Act a futile thing unless perchance the United States moved in at the
incipient stages of the unlawful project.
To require divestiture of theatres unlawfully acquired is not to add
to the penalties that Congress has provided in the antitrust laws. Like
22. Id. at 399 (quoting Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(a) 77 Pub. L. No.
421, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (emphasis added)).
23. Id. at 399-400.
24. Id. at 401 (quoting S. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942)).
25. See cases cited in SEC Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 1, at 48-55.
26. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
27. Id. at 289-90.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
29. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
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restitution it merely deprives a defendant of the gains from his wrong-
ful conduct. It is an equitable remedy designed in the public interest to
undo what could have been prevented had the defendants not outdis-
tanced the government in their unlawful project.3"
In 1960 the Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc.,31 the other case referred to by Professor Loss in this con-
text.3 2 Mitchell upheld the right of the Secretary of Labor, while attempting
to enjoin certain violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, also to seek a
court order requiring that the guilty employer reimburse his employees for
wages lost as a consequence of his unlawful discharges. The Court relied
primarily upon Porter v. Warner Holding Co.33 and, of particular impor-
tance to the SEC, the Court stated that it placed no significance on the fact
that Porter had considered a wartime statute or that the language in the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 confirmed the power to order reim-
bursement.3 4 In the latter context, the Mitchell Court stated broadly that
"[w]hen Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibi-
tions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted
cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light
of the statutory purposes." 35 Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts contained from
their inception provisions to the effect that the remedies provided for in the
statute supplemented all other remedies that might exist in equity.3 6
In 1964, yet another decision was handed down by the Supreme Court
in favor of allowing comprehensive remedies to enforce a federal regulatory
statute, this time under the 1934 Act. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,3 7 share-
holders brought a complaint against their corporation for violation of section
14(a) of the 1934 Act. They claimed the corporation used allegedly false and
misleading proxy solicitation material in a proposed merger. The plaintiffs
sought damages and declaratory and equitable relief under section 27 of the
Act.3 8 The Court, citing the Deckert, Mitchell, Porter and Schine cases,
found that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring an action for the alleged
violation of section 14(a) and that the relief sought would serve as a "most
effective weapon" in the enforcement of the proxy requirements.3 9 It went
on to state: "It is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief' where federally secured rights are invaded.''40
30. Id. at 128.
31. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
32. 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1827 n.478. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
33. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
34. 361 U.S. at 291.
35. Id. at 291-92.
36. 1933 Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1970); 1934 Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
37. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
39. 377 U.S. at 433.
40. 1d. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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This line of authority from the Supreme Court made it increasingly
likely that an SEC prayer for resitution of fraudulently obtained profits
would receive a friendly reception in federal court. Meanwhile, the Com-
mission's own somewhat negative attitude toward asserting such relief was
also undergoing a change. At least one of the reasons for the change appears
to have been a growing disenchantment with the deterrent effect of a mere
consent decree. 41
B. The Effect of Texas Gulf Suphur on the Commission's Position on
Disgorgement
The insider trading surrounding Texas Gulf Sulphur's great Canadian
mineral discovery was the final impetus that broke new ground. The Com-
mission's complaint in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, filed in April of
1965, sought rescission and restitution with respect to the allegedly fraudu-
lent transactions in addition to the standard injunctive relief. The salient
facts in the case which bear on the question of disgorgement are as follows.
With confidential information of the tremendous size of the discovery and
its obvious prospective effect on Texas Gulf Sulphur's stock, company
insiders purchased stock and calls or accepted Texas Gulf Sulphur stock
options without first disclosing this material information. The purchases
were made anonymously in the public market in which Texas Gulf Sul-
phur's stock was traded. Some of the insiders also recommended Texas Gulf
Sulphur stock to friends and relatives who then bought for themselves and in
some instances prompted others to buy. 42
This factual setting, involving as it did open market purchases with no
privity existing between the buyer and seller, the likelihood that the de-
frauded sellers were scattered about with relatively small individual losses at
stake, and the fact that sellers' losses resulted not from being defrauded of
actual cash but from being defrauded of the opportunity to make greater
paper profits, was precisely the type of setting that Professors Loss and Cary
thought would justify, from a policy standpoint, an SEC disgorgement
action.43 Surprisingly, the contention that the Comission should step in
41. Stanley Sporkin, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC, has noted that:
"It used to be that we were satisfied with merely going into court, obtaining a consent decree
and leaving it up to the private bar to sue and obtain money damages. But we have found that in
many cases this approach seems to be a waste of effort and detrimental to the interests of the
investing public." Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29
Bus. LAW. 121, 122 (Special Issue, Mar. 1974).
In 1959 the Commission said, in discussing efforts to control the "boiler room" or high
pressure securities sales methods usually accompanied by gross misrepresentations: "The
Commission has found that resort to the civil injunction and administrative proceeding, no
matter how vigorously employed, is not completely effective in halting the operation of boiler
rooms." 25 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1959).
42. The facts relevant to the fraud issue in Texas Gulf Sulphur have been carefully stated
in the two decisions of District Judge Bonsai. See 258 F. Supp. 262, 268-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and
312 F. Supp. 77, 80-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
Vol. 1977:641]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
when there is the likelihood of apathy or indifference on the part of injured
investors towards bringing a private action actually turned out to be quite
inappropriate in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. Judge Bonsai, who tried the
case, noted that at least 49 private actions had been filed against Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the individual defendants and others by the summer of 1966. 44 The
fact that numerous private enforcement actions had been initiated placed the
SEC in a patently duplicative role, and also should have hoisted into
prominence the ancient rule that equity ought not intervene where an
adequate legal remedy exists.45 Nevertheless, Judge Bonsai found in favor
of the SEC's assertion of its own claim for restitution as relief ancillary to its
injunctive action. 46 The court set forth an array of authority, including those
cases which were discussed previously, 47 to support its conclusion that the
Commission was indeed entitled to pursue and obtain court-enforced res-
titution.48 The court was apparently sufficiently convinced of the Commis-
sion's right to disgorgement that, without any further discussion, it also
applied the remedy against those defendants as to whom it had denied the
SEC's request for permanent injunctions.4 9
The Commission's novel position on restitution was first formally
explained in its Pre-Trial Memorandum to the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
It made two fundamental points in that statement to the court: first, through
disgorgement it sought to deprive defendants who engaged in fraudulent
securities transactions of their profits "in order to prevent future violations
of the law by those who have already violated Rule lOb-5 and to deter
violations by others who may contemplate them. .. ;50 and second, it was
not acting "as an instrument for particular individuals but only to enforce
and apply Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the public interest. ' ' 51 Several
years later the Commission reiterated these fundamental purposes in an
amicus brief in support of greater private remedies in class actions:
44. 258 F. Supp. at 267 n.1.
45. On the other hand, the SEC's statutory remedy, namely an injunction, was recognized
as inadequate unless supplemented by restitution granted only through the court's powers in
equity.
46. 312 F. Supp. at 92.
47. See text accompanying notes 18-40 supra.
48. 312 F. Supp. at 91-92.
49. Id. at 97-99. Subsequent securities cases have not predicated equitable relief ancillary
to an injunctive claim on actually obtaining an injunction. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. United States v, Moore, 340
U.S. 616, 620 n.6 (1951) (restitution ordered in action under Housing and Rent Act of 1947). But
see Note, Ancillary Relief in SECInjunctive Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV. L. REV.
656, 657-58 (1966); Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material
Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MiCH. L. REV. 944, 949 (1967)
(both articles suggesting that the court's equitable jurisdiction would cease upon its determina-
tion not to issue an injunction).
50. SEC Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 1, at 52.
51. Id. at 51.
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While in rare cases, as an adjunct to injunctive relief, the Commission
has urged a court to deprive violators of their illegal gains by directing
that these be paid to individuals who have been injured by their viola-
tions, even in such cases the Commission does not seek to make the
investors whole; it seeks merely to deter violations by making viola-
tions unprofitable. 2
In its Annual Report to Congress for the year 1975, the Commission
continued to emphasize its original objectives:
The SEC's primary function is to protect the public from fraudu-
lent and other unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured
individuals. Thus, a request that disgorgement be required is predicated
on the need to deprive defendants of profits derived by their unlawful
conduct and to protect the public by deterring such conduct by others.53
Identical language had also appeared in each of the three preceding SEC
Annual Reports. 54 It would appear that beginning with Texas Gulf Sulphur
the SEC has steadfastly adhered to the same position: that it seeks the
disgorgement of profits to deter unlawful conduct and that it is not intent on
obtaining recoveries for private individuals.
The SEC's desire to deter securities fraud violators through use of the
disgorgement technique is self-evident. There are a number of perhaps less
apparent reasons which explain why the Commission wants to dispel the
notion that it sues on behalf of injured investors in bringing an action for
disgorgement. In our legal system private parties are largely responsible for
vindicating their own civilly-infringed rights. The Supreme Court has reject-
ed the notion that a federal agency vested with authority to protect the public
interest can use that authority to act primarily for the benefit of a wronged
individual. In Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner,55 for example, the
FTC intervened in a bitter personal feud between two Washington, D.C.
businessmen. It ordered one of them to dease and desist from future use of
the business name used by the other, claiming that the same names caused
confusion to the public. The Court ruled against the Commission, stating
that it was not empowered to redress a private wrong under its enabling
statute even though the wrong may have an incidental adverse effect on the
public:
[T]he mere fact that it is to the interest of the community that private
rights shall be respected is not enough to support a finding of public
interest. To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be spe-
cific and substantial.5 6
52. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis by court).
53. 41 SEC ANN. REP. 97-98 (1975).
54. 40 SEC ANN. REP. 75 (1974); 39 SEC ANN. REP. 69 (1973); 38 SEC ANN. REP. 70
(1972).
55. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
56. Id. at 28. Cf. REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1974) (use of similar
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A second consideration lies in the fact that if the SEC were to proceed
as though it were the parens patriae of defrauded investors, defendants
might then be in a better position to argue the applicability to the SEC's
lawsuits of the hurdles that litigants in private actions must overcome in
seeking a recovery. 57 Courts in the past have dismissed the contention that
the SEC is subject to the same obstacles on the ground that the Commis-
sion's interest is entirely different from that of the private litigant. 58 A good
example of the SEC's privileged position is found in SEC v. Petrofunds,
Inc.,59 where the defendants argued that the accounting and disgorgement of
profits requested by the Commission in a suit for alleged fraud on investors
in oil and gas drilling properties entitled the defendants to a trial by jury.
The disgorgement of profits was identified with the relief that a private
litigant might seek under the securities laws or in traditional common law
actions. But the court dismissed this argument, saying that disgorgement
when sought by the SEC is necessary to effectuate enforcement of the
securities laws.60 A jury trial, therefore, was not required.
At present an SEC enforcement proceeding must satisfy only the bare
statutory elements of proof: use of jurisdictional means; connection with a
purchase or sale of a security; proof of a misrepresentation, misleading
omission or other deception or manipulation; and the materiality of the
misrepresentation or omission. 61 The Commission may be reluctant to adopt
a policy of actively representing defrauded investors if to do so might
jeopardize this favored status of its enforcement actions in federal court.
names by competitive air carriers violates Federal Aviation Act of 1958 only to the extent that
such use results in specific and substantial public confusion).
57. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906,923 (5th Cir. 1973) (employment
discrimination case brought by government on behalf of individuals in which the government
was held to the same statute of limitations period applicable to individuals).
58. See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 &
n.15 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Quing N. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D.P.R. 1966); S. REP. No.
74-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), where it was said with respect to enactment of § 21(g) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g): "The Commission's basic point is that, although both the
Commission's suit for injunctive relief brought pursuant to express statutory authority and a
private action for damages fall within the general category of civil (as distinct from criminal)
proceedings, their objectives are really very different. Private actions for damages seek to
adjudicate a private controversy between citizens; the Commission's action for civil injunction
is a vital part of the Congressionally mandated scheme of law enforcement in the securities
area."
59. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,743 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13,
1976).
60. Id. at 90,605. See also SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,867 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1976) (state statute of limitations and laches not
applicable to SEC disgorgement action since suit was "not predominantly an action for
restitution for the benefit of private parties." Id. at 91,192).
61. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private plaintiff must
be purchaser or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue under rule lOb-5). But see
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (SEC required to
prove scienter in lOb-5 cases).
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Third, the Commission is ill-equipped to make whole persons who are
injured by securities fraud. 62 For one thing, there are obvious budgetary and
manpower limitations. Even if the Commission were to decide to serve as
the champion of injured investors it would find itself in the uncomfortable
position of having to pick and choose between worthy causes in using its
scarce resources. This is not a problem when it is acting chiefly for its own
purposes. Finally, the SEC's recovery of defendants' profits, to the extent
that there are any to be recovered, may not compensate injured investors for
the damages they suffered, since the two amounts are not necessarily
related. 63
C. Disgorgement Compared to Other Monetary Remedies
Monetary restitution requires only that the fraudulent party relinquish
the gains obtained through the fraud. 64 Rescission and specific restitution,
on the other hand, require that both parties be placed in the status quo ante as
though the fraudulent transaction had never occurred.65 Under the latter
concept the defrauded purchaser, who no longer wants to keep the security
he has acquired, is entitled to receive back the money he paid the seller for
it. The defrauded seller may receive back the security he sold, upon
tendering the purchase price.66 Such a remedy is appropriate for a private
litigant under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws only
where he acts promptly to rescind upon discovery of the fraud. 67 It is
apparent that the amount obtained in a resitution of fraudulent gains may
vary substantially from the value of what is received by specific restitution,
and usually the two amounts will not be the same.
68
62. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); Farrand, Ancillary Remedies
in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1802-03 (1976).
63. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'don othergrounds, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
64. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 150 (1937). See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 9.3 at 617 (1973); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: The Question of Remedy, 65 Nw.
U.L. REV. 486, 490-91 (1970).
65. 3 J. POMEROY, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 910 at 578 (5th ed. 1941).
66. Should the defendant in a private action be permitted to offset any tax benefits plaintiff
obtained from his losses on the investment in determining what he owes the plaintiff when sued
for rescission? At least one court has answered this question negatively. Cooper v. Hallgarten
& Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
67. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of N.C. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs. Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1268 (4th
Cir. 1974); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1973). See Reder, Measuring
Buyer's Damages in l0b-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839, 1843 (1976).
68. Where the two amounts are the same, it is possible for the SEC to have the same choice
as a private litigant of either rescinding the transaction altogether with a re-exchange of the
consideration received by both sides or allowing the transaction to stand and seeking only
monetary restitution of the defendant's profits. See SEC v. Weisberger, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,108 at 97,943-44 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1975). Where the
SEC seeks to require an offer of recission from the defendant, complications may arise, since
the innocent investors may want to keep what they have and obtain their relief on some other
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A private litigant may also seek damages as compensation for securities
fraud as an alternative to restitution. 69 Damages are intended to "compen-
sate [him] for the harm [he] suffered . . . as a result of the wrongful
conduct, irrespective of the receipt of anything by the defendant.'"70 Just as
monetary restitution has the potential for differing greatly from specific
restitution in the value of the recovery, so too may one's damage award vary
greatly from the value of a recovery received in restitution. 71
In most actions damages are computed on the basis of either of two
theories: the "benefit of the bargain" or "out-of-pocket losses. 72 However,
it has been held that in cases of securities fraud the only appropriate
damages are out-of-pocket losses. 73 A recovery cannot include the anti-
cipated but unrealized speculation that would be appropriate under a benefit-
of-the-bargain theory.
II. LIMITATIONS ON DISGORGEMENT
A. No Penal Assessment
There are limitations on the concept of disgorgement which have been
averred to by the courts and the SEC, although they have not been particu-
larly well delineated as yet. One such limitation mentioned in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur litigation and subsequent decisions is that the remedy cannot be
applied as a penal assessment. Under the securities laws the Commission
can only recommend penal sanctions to the Attorney General; it cannot
impose them itself.74 Moreover, it has been held that the Commission
cannot impose its administrative remedies in a punitive fashion. 75
The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur attempted in vain to convince
the district court76 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit77 that the
basis rather than accept an offer of rescission. See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
69. A private litigant can, of course, recover his loss only once. 1934 Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1970); 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
70. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 64, ch. 7, Introductory Note at 522-23; see
Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 441 (D. Md. 1977).
71. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
72. Note, supra note 64, at 495. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 875 (1967).
73. Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Richard-
son v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971). See 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD § 9.1 at 226 nn.2 & 3, 227 n.4 (1971).
74. 1933 Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t (b) (1970); 1934 Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)
(West Supp. 1976).
75. Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1970) (SEC suspension of a broker reversed as
punitive).
Punitive damages are not authorized in private actions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Hill
York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 697 (5th Cir. 1971) (1933
Act violations); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
977 (1969) (10b-5 context).
76. 312 F. Supp. at 92-93.
77. 446 F.2d at 1308.
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restitution payments they would be required to make would be punitive and
therefore contrary both to the intent of Congress and the spirit of equity. In
response, both courts stressed that the restitution of profits merely deprived
the defendants of the gains derived from their wrongful conduct, a perfectly
appropriate remedy. 78 In addition, the court of appeals justified the pay-
ments as compensatory rather than punitive on the ground that the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company itself may have suffered harm to its corporate
goodwill and the public's regard for its securities as a result of insiders
abusing their corporate positions. Hence, the payments were made on a
contingent basis to the company as compensation for the damage it had
suffered. 79 The difficulty with this analysis is that it cannot be used in the
relatively common situation of insiders who fraudulently trade in the stock
of a corporation which is controlled by them, even though the corporate
goodwill may have in fact suffered because of the fraudulent trading. Any
court-ordered attempt to restore the economic loss caused to the corporate
goodwill in such a situation would merely redound to the principal benefit of
the wrongdoing shareholders.
With regard to restitution of the gains made by tippees, the
Commission explained the need to hold the tipper liable for those profits
without attempting to rationalize a compensatory ground for the remedy. It
maintained that since the tippers had made possible the profits of the persons
to whom they divulged inside information, presumably the tippers had
received certain intangible benefits by this conduct. If disgorgement stopped
with the tipper's profits, then the remedy would be undermined because the
tipper would still be encouraged to authorize others to do what he was
forbidden to do himself.80 The Second Circuit agreed with this analysis.81
The penal effect of the disgorgement relief was again raised before the
Second Circuit in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. 2 In that case,
shares in a nursing home were sold to the public under an "all-or-nothing"
registered offering-all funds received would be returned if any shares
remained unsold after a specified date. Through various contrived and false
transactions, Manor and its principals were able to make it appear that the
entire offering had been sold out prior to the offering period deadline.
78. Id.; 312 F. Supp. at 93.
79. 446 F.2d at 1308.
80. SEC Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 1, at 54-55. The Commission's Pretrial
Memorandum cited Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951), where a reorganization trustee had
allowed two of his employees to trade in securities of subsidiary companies under his control.
The Court there said the sanctions against the trustee were necessary since otherwise the strict
prohibition against a trustee trading in the securities of a debtor would serve little purpose; the
trustee would be free to authorize others to do what he was forbidden. Id. at 271-72.
81. 446 F.2d at 1308.
82. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Manor, its principals and others then took substantial financial benefits from
the fraudulent offering which the SEC sought to have disgorged.
The lower court complied with the Commission's request. 83 It ordered
a disgorgement of the proceeds received in connection with the offering
84
and also all the profits and income earned on those proceeds. The court of
appeals generally approved of the disgorgement, but could not accept the
portion of the lower court's order which required the return of profits on the
profits, finding that part to constitute a penalty assessment. The appellate
court admitted that the deterrent effect might be enhanced if profits on
profits were also disgorged. But it concluded that there was already
sufficient deterrence in the disgorgement of the underlying profits, that it
was arbitrary to assess more from defendants who had profitably invested
their illegal gains than from those who had not, and that private litigants
would not be allowed to obtain the recovery of such secondary profits. 85
Having come to this conclusion in Manor Nursing, the Second Circuit
suggested a somewhat different result several years later in Zeller v. Bogue
Electric Manufacturing Corp.,86 a private securities fraud action. There, in
a footnote, the court stated that "it seems appropriate to require the seller to
disgorge any profits he would not otherwise have been in a position to
realize if these can be traced with sufficient certainty.- 87 The court made no
reference to its decision in Manor Nursing that subsequent profits which
were perfectly traceable ought not to be disgorged, even though the
wrongdoers had earned them as a result of their fraudulent activities.
One distinction which may have influenced the court is that Manor
Nursing was an SEC enforcement action whereas Zeller was not. Perhaps
the court felt more kindly disposed toward recovery by private litigants than
by the SEC. Another possible ground for reconciling these two positions lies
in the distinction between profits on profits which are "earned" by the
defendant, as compared to such profits that are perceived to be merely a
windfall to the defendant. Disgorgement of earnings may not be considered
appropriate, but disgorgement of windfall profits may be appropriate for
several reasons. First, as between the wrongdoing party and the innocent
83. 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. The facts recited in the lower court's opinion suggest that the actual out-of-pocket
expenses of some $145,000 incurred in making the offering (which excludes the $450,000 in
selling commissions promised the defendant underwriter and the broker-dealer selling group)
were largely satisfied by the creditors agreeing to take some $142,000 worth of Manor stock
from the offering. Id. at 923, 928. Assuming this to be the case, the lower court's order that the
defendants account for all of the cash proceeds they received through the offering is the
equivalent of ordering an accounting for their fraudulent profits, since the cash proceeds
received from the offering were net of expenses.
85. 458 F.2d at 1104-05.
86. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
87. 476 F.2d at 802 n.10.
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party, any unexpected gains connected with the wrongful transaction ought
to go to the latter. Second, had the fraud not occurred, the windfall might
reasonably be expected to have come to the innocent party, at least where
the fraud was committed by a buyer.88
The distinction between earned and unearned profits on profits seems
to have been expressed more keenly in Janigan v. Taylor.s9 In that case the
president of a company bought out the stockholders on the basis of state-
ments that violated rule 10b-5. The price was $40,000. Less than two years
later the president sold his stock for $700,000. The court held that the
former shareholders were entitled to recover the full gain as unjust
enrichment, even though there was no assurance that, had the stock not been
sold, the plaintiffs could have done as well as they did. The court felt that
the profits gained were not caused by the special efforts of the president.
Had they been, the court implied that it would have measured the amount of
recovery differently. "If an artist acquired paints by fraud and used them in
producing a valuable portrait we would not suggest that the defrauded party
would be entitled to the portrait, or to the proceeds of its sale." 90
A similar type of case is Brooks v. Conston.91 The defendant in Brooks
fraudulently acquired plaintiff's chain of retail stores. The profits from the
stores were used to open new stores and to purchase other assets. Upon
proving the fraud, the plaintiff was allowed to recover everything that the
defendant had amassed since the original sale, including all the business'
profits and all of its added assets, minus a sum representing the reasonable
value of defendant's services as a manager to the business during the time he
held it. The court felt that it was appropriate to allow a deduction for
defendant's services since the assets which he had fraudulently acquired
were enhanced by the fruits of his management. 92
The Janigan and Brooks cases raise the difficult question of how one
should value economically the input of a defendant in managing the fraudu-
lent gains, if his skills and efforts are to be granted any weight at all as far as
creating profit on profit. Perhaps this problem may be more an academic
than real one, however, since courts are likely to be more influenced by the
overall equitable positions of the parties than by some economic formula. In
any event this determination is an equitable one and therefore not subject to
challenge for any lack of scientific accuracy.
The Second Circuit appears to have applied its Manor Nursing position
of non-recovery of secondary profits to a case involving secondary losses on
88. Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (where defen-
dant's profit exceeds plaintiff's actual loss, the damages are the former).
89. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
90. Id. at 787.
91. 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950).
92. Id. at 262-74, 72 A.2d at 79.
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the ill-gotten gains. In SEC v. Shapiro,93 the defendant continued to hold
stock he had fraudulently obtained after the inside information on which he
had acquired the stock became public. The district court ordered the defend-
ant to disgorge his profits computed as of the day the inside information was
publicly disclosed. 94 The defendant argued that such a disgorgement con-
stituted a penalty because he would be forced to give up more than the stock
was actually worth when it was sold, as its value had dropped after the
inside information became public. The Court of Appeals disagreed with
defendant's logic, noting that:
[Defendant's] additional losses resulted not from any penalty imposed
by the court but from his unwise investment decision to keep the stock
after February 18 [the date the inside information became public].
[A] contrary holding would create a serious anomaly that might
encourage insider trading. To require disgorgement only of actual prof-
its in cases where the price of the stock subsequently fell would create
a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the violator: he could keep
subsequent profits but not suffer subsequent losses. 95
B. Deducting for Defendant's Costs and Expenses
Can it be argued in an SEC disgorgement action that the defendant is in
effect penalized unless all of his costs and expenses incurred in connection
with the challenged transaction are properly taken into account in computing
his "profit"? The Restatement of Restitution does recognize that in making
restitution following a fraudulent transaction, the defendant is entitled to
reimbursement or to an offset for sums he paid to maintain the fraudulently
obtained property, but not to alter it to suit his personal wishes.96 Thus, A
who induces B by fraud to convey Blackacre to him is entitled, upon
returning Blackacre to B, to the purchase price and to be reimbursed for
mortgage, tax and repair payments made by him while he held the property,
but not for the cost of painting it a different color. Suppose a buyer acquires
through fraud a security, such as a limited partnership interest, where certain
additional future payments are required from the holder of that security. If
the defrauded party later rescinds the transaction and obtains specific restitu-
93. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
94. Id. at 1309.
95. Id. Note that the court's coin-toss characterization in Shapiro suggests that it had not
abandoned its position stated in Manor Nursing that a wrongdoer who profitably invests his ill-
gotten gains should not have to disgorge his secondary profits, too.
In SEC v. Blatt, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281 (S.D. Fla.
July 24, 1975), the court recognized that it could require a disgorgement of "paper profits" as
well as actual profits, citing Shapiro, but concluded that it would be inappropriate to do so in
that case. Id. at 98,444.
96. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 64, at § 158, Comments a-d.
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tion of his partnership interest, the principles in the Restatement would
appear to apply so that the fraudulent buyer must be reimbursed for any
additional payments made by him while holding the interest. However, if
the SEC were to obtain monetary restitution from the fraudulent buyer the
same principle would not appear to apply. The SEC is entitled to the profit
made on the fraudulent transaction; a subsequent payment by the purchaser
incident to his ownership of the interest does not affect that profit, even
though it will affect the overall yield on defendant's improper investment.
A more typical possible deduction for the defendant who must disgorge
concerns the costs and expenses incurred by him in connection with selling
or purchasing the securities involved. Certain provisions of the Trademark
Act of 194697 bear considerable analogy to the disgorgement context. In
enacting this legislation, Congress determined that one way to protect
trademarks was by "making infringement and piracy unprofitable." 9 8 Thus,
section 35 of that Act grants to plaintiffs the right to recover defendant's
profits. 99 Significantly, while Congress has seen fit to provide for the
recovery of "profits" as a deterrent against infringement, it has also
provided that the defendant is entitled to set off against his sales figures for
the infringing product all proven costs or deductions. 100 The statute does not
define what constitutes a "cost or deduction" for this purpose, thus leaving
that question to be resolved by the accountants and the courts.
Cases under the Trademark Act offer some instruction as to which costs
and expenses are appropriate to consider in computing a disgorgement sum.
In Aladdin Manufacturing Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 10 1 the
infringer's conduct was found to be fraudulent and willful in perpetrating the
infringement and in deceiving the public with blatantly false advertising.
Despite this lack of equity in the defendant's favor, the court took a broad
view of what were the appropriate deductions from defendant's gross profit.
It stated: "Even though the methods employed in realizing gain were not
proper, yet they were part of the costs of realization from sales from which
profits resulted. Awarding to appellant profits necessitates the deduction of
the cost of realization thereof."l°"
In applying this rationale a court could justify the non-deductibility of
fixed costs, for example, on the ground that such costs would have been
incurred even if the infringer had not made the infringing product, provided
it was producing other goods as well. By the same token, the rule expressed
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
98. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946). See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit
Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West Supp. 1976).
100. Id.
101. 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941).
102. Id. at 714. See W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
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in Aladdin resulted in allowing the deduction of the salary defendant had
paid its principal officer, even though he was the dominant force responsible
for the defendant's wrongful infringement. In explaining this result, the
court said:
[W]e are not dealing now with punitive damages but rather with actual
profits. The amount deducted as salary was actually paid [the officer]
for the management and conduct of the business and in determining the
actual profits for which appellee should account, we must credit all
costs. Salaries paid to officers are proper deductions. 0 3
The SEC has, at least in some instances, reduced or even eliminated
disgorgement claims when confronted with the defendant's costs relating to
the questioned transactions."0 4 Depending on the type of security involved,
these costs may be quite significant in securities fraud cases. A real estate
developer, for example, may solicit hundreds of thousands of dollars in the
sale of limited partnership interests to investors. Most of the money is
usually spent on acquisition and development costs, sales and real estate
commissions, legal fees and so forth. If all those items go to outsiders, the
developer's "profits" will be only a small fraction of the proceeds which he
received at the outset. Furthermore, if the developer or his company be-
comes a general partner in the limited partnership, he may incur additional
liabilities which can affect over the long term the true profit, if any, he
derives from sale of the partnership interests. As another example, a se-
curities broker-dealer will have sales commissions, administrative costs,
telephone charges and so on, in addition to the acquisition cost of the
security itself, all of which could substantially reduce the "profit" on the
purchase or sale of a security. In both instances, it would appear that the
principles of equity ought to permit the defendant to offset all of his
expenditures against the gross proceeds he received from the challenged
transaction in computing his profit. 105
103. 116 F.2d at 713. Contra, Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1959);
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd per
curiam, 204 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1953). See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 664 (1888) (no
deduction allowed for defendant's services while engaged in violating the rights of the plaintiff).
104. See SEC v. Continental Silver Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6993 (Aug. 6, 1975), 7
SEC DOCKET 534 (1975); SEC v. Continental Silver Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 7033
(July 18, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 448 (1975) (Commission staff agreed to dismiss portion of
complaint against defendants charged with violations of antifraud provisions in offer and sale of
silver investments agreements "in view of accounting furnished to the Court" by the defend-
ants); SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, SEC Litigation Release No. 6931 (June 12,
1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 177 (1975) (disgorgement sought only of funds received from public
which were not used for the purchase of commodity option contracts as promised); SEC v.
Starr, SEC Litigation Release No. 6718 (Feb. 7, 1975), 6 SEC DOCKET 275 (1975) (defendant
charged with fraud in offer and sale of oil and gas limited partnerships ordered to disgorge only
those amounts of money not applied as promised to investors).
105. See M. EHRICH, THE LAW OF PROMOTERS § 266 at 484 (1916): "A promoter should, on
accounting for his secret profits, be allowed credit for his legitimate expenses on the promo-
tion."
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Even when a court recognizes that defendants who are liable to dis-
gorge are entitled to deduct their related costs, difficult questions may
nevertheless remain in reaching an appropriate disgorgement sum. An
example is SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc.106 There the
court was confronted with four different ways to compute defendants' costs,
each a substantial monetary amount apart from the others. The defendants
had violated the federal securities laws in connection with their trading in
the securities of Beneficial Labs, Inc. from December 20, 1971 through
March 2, 1973. The SEC proposed two methods of calculating the profits to
be disgorged which employed the "first in-first out" (FIFO) accounting
concept by matching the purchase price paid for the first purchase against
the sale price of the first sale in each of the defendants' controlled accounts.
The SEC's "Method I" modified pure FIFO treatment in several respects,
however. If a purchase and sale took place the same day for the same
amount of securities, those two transactions were directly paired. Also, if
the number of securities sold in an account exceeded the number purchased,
Method I transferred an appropriate number of securities from other ac-
counts controlled by the defendant in order to fix a price basis for computing
the profits on those excess sales. The SEC's Method II differed from
Method I only to the extent of ignoring the excess sales. Under Method 1I no
securities were transferred between accounts in making the calculations. 10 7
The defendants, on the other hand, proposed "last in-first out" (LIFO)
treatment as Method I for computing the profits. In a rising market for
Beneficial's securities this method had the effect of generally reducing
profits on the individual defendant's trading by attributing a higher cost for
the securities traded than under the FIFO method. The defendants also
proposed a Method IV which ignored any transactions in Beneficial's
securities that were solely between the defendants on the ground that these
transactions did not adversely affect the public. Thus, under this last method
the total purchase price on purchases from the public was subtracted from
the total sales price on sales to the public to arrive at a net figure deemed to
be the defendant's profits. 10 8
The court found basic flaws in three of the four methods presented to it.
Method I was objectionable because there was no evidence that the defend-
ants had actually transferred securities between accounts. Method III unreal-
istically inflated defendants' purchase prices. Method IV had the effect of
allocating most of the profit to the corporate defendant, a broker-dealer,
since most of the sales to the public were made from its trading account. The
106. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,741 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
1976).




court suspected that this defendant was judgment-proof. It therefore con-
cluded that Method II achieved the most equitable result, although it recog-
nized that such an assessment was only a "reasonable estimate based on the
evidence."109
C. Income Taxes on Fraudulent Profits
Besides costs incurred in earning the profits at issue, a defendant also
will have incurred a liability for income taxes, 110 the payment of which will
further reduce his ultimate gain on the transaction. A leading case on the
question of the deductibility of income taxes in figuring profits on a trade-
mark infringement is L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co..I'
In that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, recognized that
there may be cases in which such a deduction would be proper but that it was
inequitable to do so when the infringement constituted a conscious and
deliberate wrongdoing.11 2 A similar position was taken in Wolfe v. National
Lead Co. 3 where it was said that income taxes, in the absence of mitigat-
ing circumstances, were not proper deductions. 114 A contrary position was
taken in W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc. ,15 without discussion or author-
ity, even though the court acknowledged that the infringement was willful.
One could argue that the Larson rule should not apply to SEC dis-
gorgement cases on the ground that the same equitable considerations are
not present. 116 In Larson, Justice Holmes considered the fact that the victim
of the infringement would have to pay income taxes of its own on any profits
received by it from the infringer. The Court thought it inequitable, given the
respective tax burdens, to grant a deduction to the infringer, thereby further
reducing the after-tax profits-received by the injured party.
In an SEC disgorgement case, the specific interests, tax or otherwise,
of the injured investors are disavowed by the Commission; its primary
interest is to make securities fraud unprofitable. 117 Therefore, the tax effect
on private investors ought not to be a factor to be taken into account in
weighing the respective equities. The situation is different for the defendant.
109. Id. at 90, 597.
110. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
111. 277 U.S. 97 (1928).
112. Id. at 99-100.
113. 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959).
114. Id. at 873.
115. 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970). See D. DOBBS, supra note 64, at § 4.5.
116. In Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 251 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1957), a stock-
holders' derivative action, the principal asset of the corporation, a hotel, was wrongfully
conveyed to another corporation. Defendants sought credit for federal and state income taxes
in an accounting in plaintiff's securities fraud action. The court simply held that the Larson rule
required "innocent wrongdoing," and the credit was denied. Id. at 341.
117. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
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To the extent that he must disgorge pre-tax profits using after-tax dollars, he
has obviously been deprived of not only his gains, but also the amount of the
tax on those gains. It seems, therefore, that the tax effect on him ought to be
considered.
The fact that the defendant may be entitled to claim a loss deduction
equal to the amount of his disgorged payment' 18 does not necessarily insure
that he will not incur a tax disadvantage. If he pays the tax on the questioned
profits in the first year and then must take his loss deduction in a later tax
year when he makes restitution of those profits, 119 it is unlikely that the tax
liability and subsequent deduction will actually cancel one another. The
defendant's ultimate tax bill depends on a variety of largely unpredictable
factors, including his other income and deductions in the tax years in
question and whether the same costs and expenses are used in figuring the
disgorgement amount as in figuring the taxable profits.
Rather than leave to mere happenstance the possible imposition of
unfavorable tax consequences, which in such circumstances would penalize
the defendant as a result of his disgorgement payment, it seems that greater
equity could be achieved by deducting at the outset the tax the defendant
paid on the challenged profits from the figure to be disgorged. In this way
the defendant would be assured of receiving full credit for his taxes on
income he was not allowed to keep, but credit for no more than that amount.
This approach would further require that the defendant either agree or be
ordered not to claim a tax deduction as to the adjusted disgorgement sum,
since otherwise he would be afforded a double deduction.
D. Effect of Adverse Publicity
There is no question but that the publicity surrounding SEC charges of
securities fraud will also have to a certain extent a "cost" effect upon any
target of those charges. This fact has been recognized by courts, 120 commen-
tators12' and the securities bar. 22 In a given situation it may appear that the
118. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 CuM.
BULL. 50 (restitution of embezzled funds by embezzler permits him to take a loss deduction
from adjusted gross income); Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 46 (allowance of a tax
deduction for restitution paid by reason of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act does not frustrate
public policy).
119. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
120. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Silver King
Mines, Inc. v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666, 674-75 (D. Utah 1966). See also FTC v. Cinderella
Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
121. Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 280,
284-85 (1974); Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380,
1394-98 (1973).
122. In 1964 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association recommended that all
disciplinary proceedings before the SEC be private unless the Commission determines, after
allowing respondent a private hearing, that investor protection requires a public hearing. 89
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monetary effect of adverse publicity deserves to be taken into account in
fashioning an equitable disgorgement figure.
Publicity was taken into account in determining the appropriate reme-
dial outcome in In re Provident Management Corp. 123 That case involved
violations by certain investment advisors of section 10b, rule lOb-5 and
section 17(a), among others, for having received improper payments from
brokers while acting as investment advisers to a mutual fund. The respond-
ents' settlement offer, which included the disgorgement of certain of their
profits, was accepted by the Commission partly because it took into account
the adverse publicity caused by bringing its action against the respond-
ents. 124 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the district court also acknowledged the
adverse publicity suffered by the defendants and the deterrent effect it would
have in the course of reviewing the disgorgement relief that was sought.
However, the court did not moderate the relief granted because of this
publicity.'25 Courts have, on the other hand, often recognized the harmful
impact of an injunction on the defendants' personal reputation and legiti-
mate business activities, 126 and in some cases that form of relief has been
denied as a consequence of giving consideration to this factor. 127 There
appears to be no reason why Such equitable considerations ought not to
apply as well when disgorgement relief is sought by the SEC.
E. Other Considerations
There are a variety of other factors which may in certain circumstances
limit the SEC's efforts at disgorgement. For instance, its success may be
inhibited by what could be accomplished by a litigant in a private lawsuit. A
private litigant cannot recover damages or restitution for fraud where there is
no resulting pecuniary loss.' 28 Since the SEC is concerned with deterring
fraudulent activities by depriving the wrongdoer of the monetary incentive
to commit securities fraud, the fact that private litigants could not recover
REP. A.B.A. 135 (1964). See generally ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES, REPORT OFTHE ADVISORY COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1972).
123. SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5115 (Dec. 1, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,937.
124. Id. at 80,089-90.
125. 312 F. Supp. at 90. The court did recognize that publicity alone might serve as an
adequate deterrent when the violation was a "once-in-a-lifetime affair," and on those grounds
the court could decline to issue an injunctive order against the company. Id.
126. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Broadwall Securities, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 416 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Harwyn
Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. International Camra-
Corder Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,666 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
1, 1966) (all denying injunctive relief).
128. See Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066
(1972); Levin v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 64, at § 28, Comment d at 126; 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 65, at § 898a.
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should be of no moment. Nevertheless, a court of equity looking at the
SEC's disgorgement claim is likely to be influenced by the fact that no one
was injured, even though there may have been technical violations of the
law. Even more unfavorable for the SEC is the fact that any disgorged
amount would have to be distributed to the investors who were not harmed.
The court in Manor Nursing Centers, for example, was unwilling to carry
the disgorgement remedy as far as the SEC wanted it to go, partly because
the court thought it "significant" that private litigants could not obtain a
similar recovery.129 Thus, if one could successfully demonstrate that in fact
none of the investors had either lost money or been deprived of an opportu-
nity that was rightfully theirs, a strong equitable argument could be made
that the SEC had no business suing for disgorgement.
Economics may also limit the Commission's freedom to bring actions
for disgorgement. Obviously, its finite resources cannot withstand a univer-
sal application of the disgorgement concept. The Commission may be
content in a particular case to leave to private litigants the task of obtaining a
monetary recovery and thereby deterring harmful conduct in the future. 130 It
may negotiate a settlement with the defendant whereby he agrees to waive or
toll, for a specific period and in lieu of disgorgement, the applicable statute
of limitations, thereby aiding and encouraging private investors to assert
their rights against the defendant. 13' It may also require the defendant to
129. 458 F.2d at 1104.
130. In SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the Commission brought an
action to enjoin certain defendants from future violations with respect to their insider trading.
At least one of the defendants, Investors Diversified Services, Inc. (IDS), was able to avoid
incurring a substantial loss because of the inside information it received. The SEC's action did
not seek a recovery of that "benefit" to IDS. IDS merely entered into a stipulation with the
SEC whereby it consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against such violations in the
future. Id. at 1065. However, IDS was also sued in private actions both inside and outside the
federal securities laws arising from the same facts. See, e.g., Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F.
Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated sub. nom. Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (reversed by circuit court in
favor of stockholders, vacated by Supreme Court and remanded for consideration of state law)
(alleging that IDS conspired with corporate officers to misuse corporate information). See also
S. Rep. No. 94-75, supra note 58, at 74: "Private litigants will frequently file actions, the
allegations of which closely follow those of the Commission's action, and there are.often
attempts to 'ride along on the Government's cases.'"
In SEC v. Lum's, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 6922 (June 6, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 173
(1975) and SEC v. Lum's, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 5238 (Dec. 6 1971), the complaint
alleged false and misleading proxy and registration statements made in connection with the
acquisition of a hotel. As part of the ancillary relief requested by the SEC, the defendants
contributed $1.1 million in cash towards an overall settlement of private actions which were
based on allegations similar to those in the Commission's complaint.
131. See, e.g., SEC v. Milton, SEC Litigation Release No. 3796 (Aug. 30, 1967). See also
SEC v. Nelson, SEC Litigation Release No. 7347 (Apr. 12, 1976), 9 SEC DOCKET 441, 442
(1976) (defendant agreed to appoint agents for service in New York state and federal courts for




appoint a receiver or special counsel who will investigate potential private
causes of action and sue on behalf of the innocent parties wherever appro-
priate. 13 2 The necessary deterrence is achieved through deprivation of any
gains at little cost to the SEC's limited resources.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder133 has now
held that a private right of action for damages will not lie under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 in the absence of an intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud. Because the Ernst & Ernst case involved an action
for damages, the Court chose not to consider the question of whether a
wrongful intent or "scienter" is a necessary element in an action for
injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.134 But one lower court,
relying on Ernst & Ernst, has held that scienter is a necessary element even
in an injunctive action brought by the SEC. 135 If this decision is upheld, the
Commission's disgorgement remedy, which is necessarily dependent upon
injunctive action, will be similarly restricted to instances where scienter is
present. The practical effect of such a result may not be as significant as one
might expect, however, since supposedly the Commission's limited re-
sources have always forced it to focus its attention for purposes of disgorge-
ment on willful fraud. 136
II. EXPANSION OF THE DISGORGEMENT CONCEPT
A. Equitable Considerations
Just as the Commission's disgorgement relief can be limited by special
factors, so also can special factors expand its applicability beyond the
conceptual limits. This is particularly true in the context of equity, where
"remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair and what is
132. See, e.g., SEC v. Generics Corp. of America, SEC Litigation Release No. 7218 (Dec.
29, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 951 (1976); SEC v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., SEC Litigation
Release No. 7171 (Nov. 19, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 517 (1975). See also SEC v. J.L. Mead & Co.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 7162 (Nov. 13, 1975), 8 SEC DOCKET 431 (1975).
133. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
134. Id. at 193 n. 12. However, Justice Powell's sweeping pronouncement at the end of his
opinion for the majority in Ernst & Ernst would seem to foreshadow the SEC's fate in this
regard:
When a statute [§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act] speaks so specifically in terms of manipula-
tion and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no
more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to expand the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct.
Id. at 214.
135. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Contra,
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976) (intent to deceive not
required in SEC enforcement action despite Ernst & Ernst).
136. But see Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973) (rescission sought despite fact that fraud violations appeared to be
technical and not perpetrated in bad faith).
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workable." 1 37 The case of SEC v. R.J. Allen & Associates, Inc.138 repre-
sents an example of egregiously fraudulent conduct on the part of the
defendants which led the court to order disgorgement of all proceeds
received in the fraudulent transactions. R.J. Allen & Associates was a
Florida broker-dealer which engaged, as a part of its business, in the offer,
sale and underwriting of so-called Industrial Development Revenue Bonds
(IDRs). These bonds are considered municipal bonds, but are dependent
upon the revenue of the company funded by the proceeds; they are not
backed by any state or local taxing authority, although their interest
payments are tax-exempt to the investor. 139
The evidence demonstrated that the defendants engaged in a course of
conduct designed to deceive and defraud investors by making false and
misleading statements about the guaranteed nature of the bonds and by
omitting information that should have been revealed about their real risk.
The defendants also delivered bonds other than those the investors had
purchased, and in some instances failed to execute a purchase transaction
after having received a customer's funds for a purchase. As part of their
scheme, defendants solicited former prisoners of the Vietnam war who had
accumulated substantial sums of back pay. The correspondence from the
defendants offered to invest the ex-POWS' assets in securities sold at R.J.
Allen, particularly the high risk, speculative IDRs which were palmed off as
safe, secure, liquid investments. 140 Once the truth was discovered, the court
found that many of the investors had been "left destitute" as a consequence
of the "vicious and brutal" frauds committed by defendants. 141
Given this factual setting, the court readily ordered an accounting, but
not merely for the purpose of determining the defendants' profits. The
accounting was to ascertain the full amount of the proceeds received by the
defendants as a result of the sales of IDRs. The court then discussed
"disgorgement," noting that the concept sought to deprive defendants of
the gains of their wrongful conduct. However, while making a reference to
wrongful gains, the court went much further in granting the SEC's request
for relief: "In dealing with plaintiff's prayer for disgorgement, this Court
equates disgorgement with restitution and recoupment which are equity
remedies of ancient origin." 142 The defendants were ordered to restore to
the court-appointed receiver the full amounts obtained from all the investors
137. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
138. 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). See also SEC v. Johnson, SEC Litigation Release
No. 7031 (Aug. 5, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 534 (1975) (defendant consented to order requiring him
to return the proceeds from sale of memberships in "The Money Machine").
139. 386 F. Supp. at 872.
140. Id. at 872-74.
141. Id. at 874.
142. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
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who purchased IDRs, as shown by the accounting. There was no mention by
the court of giving credit to the defendants for any costs that would have
been incurred in acquiring and selling the IDRs by the broker, including the
price of the securities. The court's only concern was with establishing an
adequate fund from which the victims of this "diabolical" scheme could
recoup their lost proceeds.
B. Tipper Liability
Another example of an expansion of the disgorgement concept to fit the
situation at hand is tipper liability for tippee profits. In Texas Gulf Sulphur
the Second Circuit was confronted with the contention of defendant Darke, a
geologist for Texas Gulf Sulphur, that the lower court's decision to require
him to pay back not only his own profits but also the profits which his
tippees had derived from their insider trading was a penalty assessment. 14 3
The court did not deny that an additional hardship was imposed on Darke.
Nevertheless, it accepted the Commission's rationale in requiring disgorge-
ment of tippee profits as well, saying:
[W]ithout such a remedy, insiders could easily evade their duty to
refrain from trading on the basis of inside information. Either the
transactions so traded could be concluded by a relative or an acquaint-
ance of the insider, or implied understandings could arise under which
reciprocal tips between insiders in different corporations could be
given. 44
This resolution has been both criticized' 45 and supported. 14 6 From the
standpoint of deterrence and the effectiveness of the disgorgement remedy,
it seems preferable to focus recovery efforts on the tipper-the source of the
confidential information and the source of its abuse-rather than on the
tippee, who merely represents an effect of the problem. For that reason,
equity imposes an additional burden on the defendant even though the result
extends the disgorgement remedy beyond its normal limits.
IV. THE MECHANICS OF DISGORGEMENT
Obtaining a disgorged sum from one accused of having or found to
have violated anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws may often prove
easier than overcoming the problem of distributing that sum fairly and
rationally. In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case the district court approved the
SEC's proposal that payments be made by the defendants to the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company, to be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account for a
143. 446 F.2d at 1308. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
144. Id.
145. Comment, supra note 49, at 963 n.101.
146. Comment, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule lob-5, 38 U.CHI. L. REV. 372,379
(1971).
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period of five years, subject to disposition by the court on application from
the SEC, any interested party, or on the court's own motion. In the event
that any defendant incurred a liability in any judgment or settlement in a
similar private action commenced before the Commission's action, that
liability would be applied against the defendant's disgorged payment. At the
end of the five year period, any money remaining would become the
property of Texas Gulf Sulphur."' 7 Such a seemingly straightforward plan
for the distribution of disgorged payments was subject to the potential for a
great deal of complexity and misunderstanding. Private claims in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur affair far exceeded the defendants' disgorged payments to the
escrow fund. There was no procedure established for an orderly and propor-
tionate distribution to competing claimants; the matter was merely left to the
court's ad hoc review.
In SEC v. Golconda Mining Co. ,148 the defendants attempted to
recover their disgorged profits when it appeared that there were not enough
claims by injured investors to absorb the fund. The defendants had con-
sented to pay some $47,000 to a court-appointed trustee after the SEC
charged them with trading on inside information. Rather than simply divid-
ing the disgorged proceeds among all those who had sold their stock during
the period of the alleged violation, the trustee was ordered to identify the
particular sellers from whom defendants had made their illicit purchases.
After diligent efforts, the trustee was unable to locate all those entitled to
payment.
The judgment provided that in such an event defendants were entitled
to reimbursement for the trustee's fees and expenses with disposition of the
balance of the disgorged fund subject to the court's discretion. Though the
defendants had never admitted their wrongdoing, the court assumed as
much, and refused to return their unclaimed profits. The money was trans-
ferred instead to the registry of the court, to be held for the perpetual benefit
of those persons entitled to payment or their successors in interest. 149 The
court concluded that it would be contrary to public policy to allow the
violators to profit, even belatedly, from their fraud. 150
Previously disgorged funds were successfully recovered by the defend-
ant in SEC v. General Host Corp.,"' however. Judge Weinfeld, who ruled
in the SEC's favor in Golconda, concluded in General Host that a $300,000
disgorgement fund established by one of the defendants, Allen & Company,
147. 312 F. Supp. at 93. In this instance equity takes on an added twist by granting a
contingent recovery to the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, one of the wrongdoers.
148. 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
149. The funds were to be held by the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2042 (1970) which
govern the deposit and withdrawal of monies paid into any court of the United States.
150. 327 F. Supp. at 259-60.
151. 73 Civ. 275 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1977).
Vol. 1977:641)
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
-as part of a consent judgment with the SEC should be returned to it. Allen
sought to recover its fund when a private class action against it and other
defendants that had largely tracked the SEC's action failed to establish its
claim of securities violations.152 The SEC and Allen were in accord that no
other lawsuit was likely to be filed in the wake of the unsuccessful class
action and in light of the applicable statutes of limitation.
The Commission argued, nevertheless, that the trust fund should not be
returned to Allen but should rather be donated to charity. In support of this
argument the SEC claimed first that this is what the parties contemplated
when drafting the settlement agreement and, second, that Allen should not
be given back the profits it derived from violations of the federal securities
laws. Allen disputed the SEC's version of what the parties had contemplated
and further contended that the money ought to be returned, since any other
disposition would constitute a penalty against it.
Judge Weinfeld found that there was no prior understanding between
the SEC and Allen to the effect that the trust funds, if not dispersed to
private litigants in actions arising out of the alleged violations, would then
be donated to charity. Absent the defendant's consent in an agreement with
the SEC to such a disposition, the court found itself powerless to direct that
the disgorged funds be distributed to charity. In dealing with the SEC's
second argument, the court noted, in reversing its previous position ex-
pressed in Golconda, that the settlement recited Allen's consent to the
disgorgement "without admitting or denying any of the allegations of the
amended complaint" and "that there ha[d] been no finding or [sic] fact or
. . . adjudicated matter with respect to any matter alleged in or arising out
of the amended complaint . "..."153 The court then stated that "[iun
considering the disposition of the fund, the Court must accept the consent
decree 'as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.' "
Though Golconda was not dealt with in the General Host decision, it
seems the contrary outcome in the latter case is distinguishable in that the
defendant litigated the issue of its liability and was found not liable prior to
seeking a return of its funds. In Golconda the defendants sought the return
of their funds as soon as the trustee had exhausted his attempts to locate the
remaining rightful claimants. There was no judicial determination that the
defendants were not liable for the violations alleged by the SEC.
The court, however, chose not to explain its decision in these terms.
The position Judge Weinfeld took in General Host suggests that a fund for
private claimants established pursuant to an SEC consent settlement may
152. Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinfeld, J.),
aff'd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
153. SEC v. General Host Corp., Slip op. at 10 (quoting the prior consent judgment).
154. Id. at 11 (citing United States v. Arjour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971)).
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one day be returned to the defendant who neither admits nor denies liability
in consenting to create the fund, provided he can show the court by means of
the statutes of limitations or otherwise that no valid claims will be made in
the future against the fund.
It is at best uncertain, as Golconda and General Host demonstrate, that
the defendant can eventually gain back what he gave up in the event that
various complications prevent a complete distribution. On the other hand,
steps can be taken to protect the defendant against losses to him beyond
what is represented by the actual disgorgement. In Texas Gulf Sulphur an
escrow account was established, which is presumably less expensive than
the use of a trustee as in Golconda."' The SEC has also consented to a
defendant serving as his own trustee, to be monitored by a third party. 15 6
The defendant must also be protected against separate public and private
recoveries for the same wrong. 157 In addition, to the extent that any portion
of the disgorged sum goes unclaimed for a period of time long enough to
permit invocation of the applicable statute of limitations or laches, it would
appear that the defendant is entitled to have any distribution costs paid by
him reimbursed from the unclaimed amount (as in Golconda) as well as any
other costs, such as attorneys' fees. If the judgment provides that the
defendant may be reimbursed years later for some or all of his costs, that can
hardly be said to undermine the deterrent effect of the earlier disgorgement.
Furthermore, even if all his costs are eventually reimbursed, the defendant




It appears that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is likely to be employed
even more widely in the future than it has been in the past. Recently, the
155. In SEC v. Blatt, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,281 at
98,445 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 1976), the trustee's costs were taxed against all of the defendants
found liable for fraud, even though only one had to disgorge his profits.
156. SEC v. Downey, SEC Litigation Release No. 7084 (Sept. 12, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 895
(1975). But cf. SEC v. Satenstein, SEC Litigation Release No. 6746 (Feb. 19, 1975), 6 SEC
DOCKET 335 (1975) (defendants agreed to disgorge profits plus an additional 10% to cover cost
of administering the fund).
157. See SEC v. Drew National Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6995 (July 18, 1975), 7
SEC DOCKET 449 (1975) (disgorgement account maintained "for the purpose of providing a
fund for payment of adjudicated or settled claims arising out of [defendants'] alleged insider
trading"); SEC v. Stirling Homex Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6960 (July 2, 1975), 7 SEC
DOCKET 370 (1975) (defendant agreed to disgorge profits pursuant to a plan to be determined by
the court, providing that such disgorgement would await and be limited by the results of all civil
actions pending with respect to the matters covered in the SEC complaint and all settlements
which had been entered and satisfied by the defendant); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F.
Supp. 77, 93 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
158. Such an approach would not be appropriate, however, if the court and the SEC intend




Commission sought and obtained the disgorgement of profits in an action
where the defendant was not charged with a direct securities violation but
rather with a violation of an SEC administrative order outstanding against
him from prior securities violations.' 59 More far-reaching are the SEC's
recent requests for monetary relief in its suits against corporate officials for
unreported corporate payments. The Commission has filed a number of
complaints against corporate officers which have alleged reporting, and not
anti-fraud, violations, yet have sought relief which required the individual
defendants to repay all corporate funds used for the illegal or improper
payments. 160
In boldly demanding this type of equitable remedy, the Commission
has left by the wayside its two strongest arguments for convincing a court to
exercise its equity powers in favor of disgorgement ancillary to injunctive
relief: (1) that securities fraud deserves to be deterred by potent, effective
measures; and (2) that a wrongdoer ought not to be permitted to retain the
profits of his wrongdoing. The equitable considerations are far less compel-
ling where there are only reporting violations. For one thing, investor losses
caused by a company's failure to report improper payments, which may
span a number of years, are surely more speculative and remote than those
resulting from fraud. Furthermore, it would appear that the corporate offi-
cials who may have acted improperly did so primarily for the benefit of their
corporations and only incidentally for themselves. Even at that, one could
not say with much conviction that such officers acted illegally or failed to
act because of personal avarice. Finally, the monetary recovery obtained by
the SEC is no longer a function of the profits or gains, if any, realized by the
defendants. Hence, the recoveries in such cases may appear rather arbitrary
when held up against the differing degrees of culpability of the various
defendants.
The Commission is nevertheless showing no reluctance to push a
relatively novel remedy to new limits and into diverse areas. Thus, the
courts may again be faced with questions as to how far the SEC can go in
asserting its implied power to obtain broad monetary sanctions without the
benefit of an explicit authorization from Congress.
159. SEC v. Fields, SEC Litigation Release No. 7102 (Sept. 26, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 1016
(1975) (defendant consented to an injunction against further violations of rule 2(e) of the SEC
Rules of Practice and to disgorge all fees, compensation or other consideration which he had
received since an earlier rule 2(e) action against him in which he was permanently barred from
practice before the SEC [SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), 2 SEC
DOCKET 1 (1973)]).
160. See, e.g., SEC Complaints in SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., No. 75-0794 (D.D.C. May 16,
1975); SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 75-0324 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1975); SEC v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., No. 3-75-29 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 1975); SEC v. American Ship Building Co., No. 74-588
(D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1974).
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